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NOTES
NORTH CAROLINA BAR ASSOCIATION MEETING

The twenty-ninth annual meeting of the North Carolina Bar
Association was held in Pinehurst on May 5, 6, 7, 1927. It was
the largest meeting on record with over four hundred members
registered. There were plenty of meetings and discussions and
politics to keep everybody busy and also many social affairs for the
wives and families of the lawyers. The Moore County Bar entertained at the Country Club on Friday afternoon.
At the opening meeting on Thursday evening, the Bar Association was welcomed by H. F. Seawell of the Moore County Bar and
the response was made by Francis 0. Clarkson of the Charlotte Bar.
Mr. John D. Bellamy then gave the President's address and this was
followed by an address by Claude G. Bowers, Editor of the Evening
World and author of a recent book on Jefferson and Hamilton, on
"Thomas Jefferson and Courts." Both of these addresses were most
interesting and were listened to with evident attention.
[332]

NOTES
The next morning was given over to round table conferences.
Mr. G. V. Cowper led the discussion on the judicial system, recommending that the rotation of judges be abolished. A spirited debate
followed, and the matter was referred to a committee to report at
the next annual meeting. The memorial to deceased members was
delivered by E. S. Parker, Jr., of Greensboro.
At the evening meeting on Friday, the principal address was by
Former Governor Charles S. Whitman of New York, President of
the American Bar Association, on "Some tendencies in Modern Law
and Law Making." This address was very well received and was
followed by the report of the committee on Bar-incorporation, by
Ira M. Bailey of Raleigh. This report was brought up again on
Saturday morning, but was postponed for further consideration to
the next annual meeting. The whole question of incorporating the
Bar was new and of great importance and will cause a good fight
at the next meeting. The election of officers resulted in the choice
of Mark W. Brown of Asheville as President, and Miss Carrie L.
McLean of Charlotte, H. F. Seawell of Carthage and A. Wayland
Cooke of Greensboro as Vice-Presidents. Henry M. London of
Raleigh was re-elected secretary and treasurer, and Judge W. S.
Robinson of Goldsboro and I. M. Bailey of Raleigh were named as
new members of the executive committee. Those who were present
will look forward to the thirtieth annual meeting with pleasure, if
the success of this meeting is a good criterion of Bar Association
meetings.
ADMISSIBILITY

OF

NON-TESTIMONIAL

EVIDENcE

EXTORTED FROM

THE AccusED BEFORE AND AT THE TRIAL

In a recent South Carolina' case the defendant was accused of
attempting to commit murder. It appeared that she had gone into
her neighbor's garden and sprinkled paris-green on his turnip tops.
In doing so she left foot prints leading from her home to the garden.
After being arrested she was taken to the garden and compelled to
place her foot in the track. In doing it she moved her foot about in
a manner calculated to prevent comparison. The officer then made
her give up a shoe which he took and compared with the track himself. On trial, witnesses who had been present, were allowed to
testify, first that the defendant had tried to prevent the making of
a comparison and second that the shoe was taken by the officer and
compared with the track.
1

State v. Griffin (1924) 129 S. C. 200, 124 S. E. 81.
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. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that evidence concerning
the comparison made by the sheriff was admissible, but that evidence
of his attempt to make the defendant put her foot in the track was
not admissible because it was a violation of the accused's constitutional privilege.
The Court distinguished between the acts performed by the sheriff
and those performed by the accused, saying that the first did not
involve testimonial compulsion and that the second did. In the
exact words of the Court, "Evidence gotten by the means and under
the circumstances should have been excluded. If the conformity had
been perfect, that fact would have appeared from the enforced
conduct of the defendant, clearly testimonial compulsion. If otherwise, as appeared, the inference of guilt from the effort to obliterate
the track would have been a legitimate basis of comment; it would
have been supplied by the defendant, a clear case of testimonial
compulsion, as Wigmore aptly terms it."
The case gives rise to the question of how far a sheriff may go
in obtaining evidence from an accused, and in forcing him to "make"
evidence which may tend to incriminate himself. There are three
general rules involved: first, the rule of the Fourth Amendment,
providing against illegal seizures, second, the rule excluding involuntary confessions and third, the rule of the Fifth Amendment (and
similar provisions in state constitutions), privileging an accused
against being forced to incriminate himself. It is ii the construction
of the latter that we find a conflict in the authorities. On the one
hand we have the broad view which permits of a rather free use
of the defendant's person in obtaining evidence for identifying him
with the crime, on the other hand, we find a small group of courts
adhering to the narrow view which holds up a restraining hand in
every case where it appears that the accused was made to lend his
person to the aid of the state's case.
The arguments for the narrow view are few indeed, and with
one exception, are based on sentiment rather than reason. Several
centuries ago a great many abuses were practiced by officers of the
courts in extorting evidence from a victim.' Out of the feeling
that these abuses aroused grew the idea that the defendant in the
case should be protected from the tricks and coercion of the prosecutor. But today arguments based on that feeling have lost much
'4 Wigmnore, 2250 (History of the Privilege).
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of their force. One eminent writer speaks of the reasons for the
rule as the "old woman's" reason and the "fox hunter's" reason,
by which he meant, first, the argument that it is unfair and cruel
to make a defendant help in his own conviction and, second, that
he should be given a sporting chance to escape. 3 Among the sound
arguments for the privilege is the one of public policy. It would
be bad policy, as any one will admit, to encourage careless investigation in officers of the state, by allowing them to depend too much
on evidence contributed by the defendant himself, either before or
at the trial. If the prosecution is allowed to demand answers to
its questions it would not be long before it would assume the right
to the answer it expected, clearly an intolerable state of affairs.
Harsh police methods need some restraining force, the most effective of which is a rule that makes the results obtained by such methods useless.
From a study of the cases it appears that there are, broadly speaking, two views, the narrow and old fashioned view and the liberal
and modem view. They are in direct conflict with each other and,
while the conflict appears to be simply a difference in the interpretation of similar constitutional and statutory provisions, the interpretation is based on fundamentals, and it is doubtful if both can
be right. Modern decisions expressing the thought of the majority
of the courts clearly show that the trend is toward the liberal rule.
It is believed that the following classification of the cases will clarify
the problem. The classification ranks the methods of securing evidence and applications of the rules thereto, in chronological order,
beginning with the period before arrest and running through the
several stages up to and including the trial.
1. Cases in which some tangible evidence is taken, without due
process, from the defendant or his premises before arrest."
These cases involve the rule against illegal seizures as well as
the self-incrimination rule. But, in regard to the latter it will suffice to say that there are two widely accepted views of the admissibility of evidence illegally seized. In the majority of the state
courts evidence illegally seized is admissible and these courts decline
to examine into the methods by which the evidence was secured. In
'4 Wigmore, 2251.
' State v. Wallace (1913) 162 N. C. 623, 78 S. E. 1; Adams v. N. Y. (1903)

192 U. S. 585.
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a few state courts and in the Federal Courts,' illegal seizure is good
cause for excluding evidence. The rule against illegal seizures is
beyond the scope of this article and it is referred to simply to com-

plete the picture.'
2. Cases in which some tangible object was taken from the defendant's person or premises after arrest:
These cases may be divided into two classes. The first includes
those cases in which the arrest of the defendant was-illegal. If the
arrest was illegal then it would seem that any objects taken from the
defendant would be illegally seized and that the rules applicable to
illegal seizures, supra, apply. The second class includes those cases
in which the defendant's arrest was legal. If his arrest was legal, is
seizure of real evidence from his person or premises legal? The
great weight of authority holds that seizure after legal arrest is legal
and that evidence so seized is admissible in court. 8 Even those states
in which the narrow view obtains admit "real" evidence taken from
the defendant after legal arrest as exemplified in the topic case, but
these states are given to drawing very fine distinctions. In cases, as
in the South Carolina case, .supra,where the object was discovered or
taken from the accused by an officer it is admissible, but if the defendant was make to produce or "discover" it, the courts exclude it
on the ground that his constitutional privilege has been violated.'
This is an outstanding example of the fallacious reasoning in the
old-fashioned, narrow construction of the privilege. It is clear that
when the accused has been made to give up, as in one case, a key
to a safe where incriminating evidence was found, that he was forced
to give up evidence, but has he been forced to incriminate himself?
Clearly not, "Unless" as Wigmore says, "All bodily action were
synonymous with testimonial utterances."'"
Suppose, for instance, that the accused has been arrested and officers enter his home under proper search-warrant. In an unlocked
closet a bloody knife is found that tends to incriminate the accused.
When offered in court this evidence is admitted because the accused
'Day v. State (1879) 63 Ga. 667; Holt v'. U. S. (1910) 218 U. S. 245, ac-

cused forced to put on a garment.
'See 5 N. C. Law Rev. 264.

'State v. Simmons (1922) 183 N. C. 684, 110 S. E. 591, liquor illegally
seized admitted in court.
"State v. McIntosh (1913) 94 S.C. 439, 78 S.E. 327, compelling accused
to give up shoes not a violation of his privilege.
' Underwood v. State (1913) 13 Ga. A. 206, 78 S.E. 1103, forcing accused
to give up key to a safe is a violation of his privilege.

"Wigmore, sec. 2265.
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was not forced to produce it. But suppose that under the same
circumstances the searchers found the closet locked. They ask for
the key, which is given them by the accused. When the knife is
found and offered in court it is excluded simply because the accused
was forced to give up the key to the closet, which in the eyes of
those courts is a violation of his privilege. Is such a distinction justified by sound reasoning? It does not seem so. And such a rule
is of little protection to either an innocent or guilty man or his property, for it obviously tends toward ruthless and destructive methods
of searching.
3. Cases in which the defendant was forced to create some "real"
evidence after arrest, which is later offered in court.
Let us suppose that the defendant after his arrest is forced to
give a sample of his handwriting" which is to be compared with some
incriminating document. Has he been forced to incriminate himself ?
There is little doubt that this evidence would be excluded in those
states which adhere to the narrow view and it is probable that some
of the "border-line" states would concur with them, because such
compulsion does approach the limit of the liberal rule? But, forcing
the defendant to give a sample of his handwriting is no more a violation of his privilege than is forcing him to make a finger print or
foot print or to submit to Bertillion measurements for the same
purpose of identification.' The specimen should be admitted in court
so long as the content of the writing has no significance. But for
the purpose of comparing handwriting and spelling, a sample of
handwriting forced from the defendant is not testimonial compulsion
and should be admitted in evidence.'
4. Cases in which the defendant was forced to do some act later
described in court?
'Moon v. State (1921) 22 Ariz. 418,. 198 Pac. 288, finger prints admitted
"Wigmore, sec. 2265.
"Downs v. Swan (1909) 111 Md. 53, 73 AtI. 653, measuring and photographing proper. See State v. Cerciello (1914) 86 N. J. L. 309, 90 AtI. 1112,
contra.
" Johnson v. Com. (1887) 115 Pa. 369, 9 AtI. 78, defendant compelled to
repeat words.
"State v. Neville (1918) 175 N. C. 731, 95 S. E. 55, putting accused in
position before a window not a violation of his privilege; State v. Thompson
(1912) 161 N. C. 238, 76 S. E. 249, evidence that tracks fitted defendant's shoes
admissible; Dunwoodie v. State (1903) 118 Ga. 308, 45 S. E. 412, not error to
admit evidence that accused was forced to make a track in the earth.
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This class of cases, which is exemplified by the South Carolina
case described in the first part of this note, includes all acts that the
defendant is made to perform after arrest but before trial. It is distinguished from the next preceding class in that no new, real evidence
is forced from the defendant as in the third class. Consequently the
only rule here involved is that of the Fifth Amendment.
The South Carolina case" is a good example of the narrow rule
and the argument the court advanced is typical of those advocating
that view. The court said that "in the interest of justice" evidence
that the defendant had been forced to put her foot in track should
have been excluded, and that the act was "clearly testimonial compulsion." The first argument is plainly the kind we find in the "old
woman's" reason spoken of before-sentiment and not reason at all.
The court then cited it as a clear case of testimonial compulsion, but
here it seems that the court erred. Bodily action and testimonial utterances are not synonymous and force alone is not the criterion of
testimonial compulsion.
There is no sound reason for including acts of this kind in those
excluded by the privilege. In forcing the accused to place his foot
in a track or his body in various positions his testimonial capacity is
not called upon. No coercion, however cruel, and no hope or fear in
his breast can change the physical facts obtained by such comparison.
Admitting testimony of these facts does not promote carelessness in
public officers nor harsh police methods. Excluding such evidence
is no protection to an innocent man but does act as a shield for the
guilty. If the prisoner is innocent, the comparison will tend to prove
his innocence, if he is guilty the state is entitled to the identifying
evidence." Admitting the evidence is in the interest of justice, excluding it is in the interest of the guilty. Of course, there is a small
danger in some cases that the foot of an innocent prisoner will be
similar to the track of the guilty man, but this is true of most circumstantial evidence and is not sufficient reason for excluding all
evidence of the type.
5. Cases in which the defendant is forced to make a communfcation.
This is the last class of out-of-court proceedings of which evidence is to be offered in court. Cases in which a verbal communica-Dunwoodie v. State (1903)

118 Ga. 308, 45 S. E. 412; Elder v. State

(1915) 143 Ga. 363, 85 S. E. 97, error to admit evidence that defendant's foot
fitted a track, he having been forced to place it in the track.

"State v. Johnson (1872) 67 N. C. 55.
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tion is forced from the defendant, out of court, naturally divide themselves into two classes. First, where the communication is in the
nature of a confession offered to show the truth of the matters confessed. Under the familiar rule as to confessions these are uniformly
excluded Where made under compulsion.' 8
But, when the communication was forced from the prisoner for
the purpose of identifying his voice or as the basis of judging his
sanity, the rule of the Fifth Amendment alone is involved. The case
is on the border line and has caused a wide split in the authorities.'
But, following the modern rule to its logical conclusion, communications should be admitted when the words that are spoken are not incriminating in themselves. Though verbal communications are very
close to testimonial utterances when used only for identification of
voice they are quite similar to specimens of handwriting, mentioned
in class 3, and should be subject to the same rules.
6. Cases in which the defendant was forced to produce new "real"
20
evidence in court.
This class of cases comprises those in which the defendant was
forced to give a specimen of his handwriting or make a foot print
and corresponds to class 3. The outstanding difference between the
two is, that in this class the defendant himself is forced to bring the
evidence before the court while in the other class some officer or
witness brings the evidence into court. But the. distinction is superficial and the reasons and rules involved in class 3 apply here.
2
7. Cases in which the defendant is forced to act in court ' as by
rolling up his sleeves, etc.
Corresponding to class 4, supra, in which the question of the admissibility of Evidence concerning acts forced from the defendant
out of court, we have the same question involved in court proceedings.
In addition to the arguments advanced for admitting evidence in
the former class, which are applicable here, we also have the argument that the court, for the sake of an orderly trial, may require the
"'Darnell v. State (1925-Tex.) 274 S. W. 591, admissibility of confessions.
"3 Wigmore, 2267.
'State v. Garrett (1874) 71 N. C. 85, proper to make defendant take off
bandage; Stokes v. State (1875) 5 Baxt. 619, 30 Am. Rep. 72.
:'State v. Ah Chuey (1879) 14 Nev. 79, proper to make defendant expose
a tatoo mark; State v. Coleman (1924) 96 W. Va. 544, 123 S. E. 580, physical
and mental examination during trial not a violation of defendant's privilege;
State v. Ruck (1906) 194 Mo. 416, 92 S. W. 706; State v. Johnson (1872)
67 N. C. 55.

340

THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

defendant to sit or stand in a convenient place. However, this power
is limited to those two acts and other acts must be admitted under the
rules in class 4.
8. Cases in which the defendant is forced to communicate when

in court.
This is the final step in the problem and involves the rule of
the Fifth Amendment. That rule is clearly applicable to this' class
and prevents any coercion in making the defendant give a communiin court.
G. M. SHAW.
IMPEACHMENT DY EVIDENCE OF A WiTNEss's BAD CHARACTER

An attack on a witness's character is one of the usual ways of
discrediting his testimony.1 This attack may be made upon cross
examination of the attacked witness 2 or by bringing in other witnesses to testify as to the character of the attacked witness. This
note is devoted to the latter form of attack. The witness offered to
make such attack is called the impeaching Witness. The sole
purpose of producing an impeaching witness is to attack the credibility of the attacked witness and show that the facts about which he
has testified are probably other than stated. The testimony of such
impeaching witness is not substantive evidence bearing directly on
the facts in issue, but is extrinsic evidence aimed only to show that
the attacked witness did not tell the truth on the stand.2 ' Hence the
general purpose of impeaching a witness is to lighten the weight of
his testimony with the jury.
There is some conflict of authority as to whether in proving character the party is limited to the witness's character for truth and
veracity, or whether the general bad moral character of the witness
can be shown. It seems to be universally held that character for
truth and veracity is always admissible." The primary purpose is
to attack the witness's credibilty, and character for truth and veracity,
of course, goes directly to the credit of the witness's testimony. The
majority of jurisdictions limit the inquiries to character for truth

'The general ways of impeaching witnesses are (1) by proof that his general character or reputation is bad, (2) by proof that he has previously made
contradictory or inconsistent statements, or (3) by proof of his bias, interest
or hostility. (28 R. C. L. 614)
'See Cross-Examination to Impeach, 36 Yale L. J. 384 (comment on Sacco
and Vanzetti trial).
" Mcdlin v. County Board of Education (1914) 167 N. C. 239, 83 S. E. 483.
3Wigmore, Evidence (2nd. ed.), Vol. 2, sec. 922.
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and veracity and do not allow inquiries relative to the general moral
character of the witness; other jurisdictions allow an extension of the
4
inquiry to the general moral character of the witness.
North Carolina adopts the minority view and holds that the
general bad character of the witness may be shown, 5 the theory
being that it is the general experience of mankind that a man of bad
moral character will lie, i. e., that moral degeneration shows an inevitable degeneracy as to truth telling. Such theory might seem
questionable, for it is obvious that the fact that a man has a bad
moral character does not necessarily mean that he will lie. However, it is generally conceded that a man of good moral character
is less likely to lie than a man of bad moral character. It may be
that this view is a mere tradition which has grown up as a result
of the personal hatred with which the public looks on a person of bad
morals. Low intelligence is a common factor in false swearing and
bad moral character, and it would not seem logically improbable
that bad moral character might indicate a probable liar, but psychologists would not support such a view.8 As pointed out by Wigmore, 7
there are objections to allowing the general bad moral character of
the witness to be shown. It is not even uncommon that a person
of bad moral character is a truthful person, and the estimate of an
ordinary witness as to another's general bad character is apt to be
loosely formed from uncertain data and to rest in large part on personal prejudice and difference of opinion on points of belief or conduct. In all cases of impeaching the character of a witness the only
phase of character which is material is character for veracity, and
the only purpose of admitting evidence of a general bad moral character is to throw light on the attacked witness's probable character
for truth.

It is universally held that the character of a witness cannot, by
extrinsic evidence, be impeached by proof of particular acts, 8 and
it has even been held incompetent to show that the witness lied on a
'Wigmore, Evidence (2nd. ed.) Vol. 2, sec. 923; 41 L. R. A. (NS) 877
note; 82 A. S. R 30 note.
'State v. Boswell (1829) 13 N. C. 209; State v. Steen (1923) 185 N. C.
768, 117 S. E. 793.
'See Healy, Pathological Lying, Accusation, and Swindling Ch. 1; Munsterberg, On the Witness Stand, page 231 et seq.

'Note 3 supra.
"Wigmore, Evidence (2nd. ed.) Vol. 2, sec. 987; 82 A. S. R. 30 note;

State v. Steen (1923)

185 N. C. 768, 117 S. E. 793; Marcorn v. Adams (1898)

122 N. C. 222, 29 S E. 333; State v. Killian (1917) 173 N. C. 792, 92 S. E.
499; Tillotson v. Currin (1918) 176 N. C. 479, 97 S E. 395.
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former occasion.9 The reason for this rule is that it would take up
too much of the court's time to allow inquiries into act after act
of the witnesses, and would take the witness by slrprise when he
would not be prepared to defend himself against fabricated testimony of impeaching witnesses. It would also becloud the main
issues in the case causing much confusion and tending to mislead the
jury.
This does not mean, however, that records of former convictions
of particular offences are not admissible, or that particular acts of
misconduct cannot be shown on cross examination.1 0 In these two
instances the reason for the rule ceases to exist. In admitting records of former convictions there is no danger of confusion of issues, for such records are usually few in number, and the record
of conviction being conclusive cannot be reopened to raise new issues.
There is no danger of surprise, for the witness knows whether or
not he has ever been convicted. In cross examination the matter
stops with the question and answer, and there is no danger of confusion. The witness is not taken by unfair surprise for he is not
obliged to answer extrinsic testimony of the opponent, for there is
none to be answered. The opponent cannot proceed to prove facts
by extrinsic testimony, and must take the chance of the witness's
own answer. Both the admission of court records and the cross
examination are further limited by the principles of relevancy.11
In North Carolina and jurisdictions where general bad character is
allowed for purposes of impeachment the record of conviction of
any offense will serve to indicate such bad character. 12 In jurisdictions where character for truth and veracity only is admissible, then
records of only such specific offences as indicate a lack of veracity
are admissible, i. e., records of such offences as perjury, fraud, forgery, and the like.
Inquiry may, of course, extend to the reputation of the witness,18
for character is evidenced by general reputation, character being
what the person really is and reputation being what a person is supposed or reputed to be. The courts often confuse the terms "char'Commonwealth v. Kennon (1881) 130 Mass. 39.
"Wigmore, Evidence (2nd. ed.) Vol. 2, secs. 980 and 981.
"State v. Patterson (1876) 74 N. C. 158.
"Coleman v. R. R. (1905) 138 N. C. 351, 50 S. E. 690 (admitting evidence
to show that witness had been convicted of forcible trespass) ; State v. Holder
(1910) 153 N. C. 606, 69 S. E. 66.
"State v. Spurling (1896) 118 N. C. 1250, 24 S. E. 533; State v.Williams
(1914) 168 N. C. 191, 83 S. E. 714.
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acter" and "reputation" and use the word "character" for both actual
disposition and reputation of it. The two terms, however, are separate and distinct. Character is the inner nature of the person and
reputation is only a way of evidencing character. It is not impossible for a man to have a good character and be suffering from a
bad reputation. 14 Yet in our present stage of development it would
be very difficult to show a witness's character if it could not be done
by proof of his reputation. The reputation must be the general
reputation of the whole community in which the witness resides,
15
The reputation does
and must not be merely personal opinion.
16
not have to be of any particular time provided it is not too remote,
for in the eyes of the law a man's character, as evidenced by his
reputation, does not change suddenly.
In North Carolina it has been held proper to ask the impeaching witness the conventional question if he would believe the attacked
witness on oath, 17 such opinion being based on a knowledge of the
attacked witness's general reputation and not on any particular facts.
It seems, however, that later authorities would exclude such questions, and prohibit the impeaching witness's opinion testimony just
18
Obviously
as it would be excluded in cases of substantive evidence.
the opinion of the impeaching witness is a mere conclusion which
should be exclusively for the jury.
The evidence of the impeaching witness cannot extend to particu19
Hence it is improper
lar acts or habitual courses of misconduct.
to show solely for the purpose of impeachment that a witness is a
bootlegger or a prostitute, 20 for these are particular classes of mis"Bottoms v. Kent (1855) 48 N. C. 154.
"State v. Steen. (1923) 185 N. C. 768, 117 S. E. 793; State v.Mills (1922)
184 N. C. 694, 114 S. E. 314; State v. Coley (1894) 114 N. C. 879, 19 S. E.
705; State v. Perkins (1872) 66 N. C. 126; Wigmore, Evidence (2nd. ed.)
Vol. 3, sec 1615.
"eState v. Lanier (1878) 79 N. C. 622 (held that the evidence was not too
remote where the impeaching witness attacked the character of the witness
as it existed some two or three years before the trial).
"State v. Boswell (1829) 13 N. C. 209.
"State v. Caveness (1878) 78 N. C. 484.
" State v. Bullard (1888) 100 N. C. 484, 6 S. E. 191 (excluded evidence that
there was a prevalent rumor that witness had been guilty of fraud) ; Nelson
v. Hunter (1906) 140 N. C. 598, 53 S.E. 439, 40 A. L. R. 131 note.
" State v. Brodie (1925) 190 N. C. 554, 130 S. E. 205; Warlick v. White
(1877) 76 N. C. 175 (holding that a female witness cannot be impeached by
an attack upon her reputation for chastity) ; State v. Giles (1889) 103 N. C.
391, 9 S. E. 433 (evidence of illicit intercourse of witness held not admissible) ;
Tillotson v. Currin (198) 176 N. C. 479, 97 S. E. 395 (excluded evidence of
a reputation for dealing in whiskey); in Baker v. Rose, 18 Wend (N. Y.)
146, Walvorth, C. J., after stating that reputation for a particular class
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conduct. Particular acts of immorality or wrong doing cannot be
21
shown.
In all cases of impeaching a witness's character the witness must
first qualify by stating that he knows the general reputation of the
person in question,2 2 unless no objection is made to his failure to
do so. After having properly qualified and given evidence as to
the attacked witness's bad character the impeaching witness may of
his own volition qualify his testimony and state in what respects the
attacked witness's character is bad. 23 The impeaching witness must
have knowledge of the reputation of the person in question; mere
24
rumor is not admissible.
In addition to these ordinary ways of impeachment there may be
impeachment by expert testimony to show mental or moral defects,
or to show that the witness is a pathological liar. In North Carolina
it has been held competent to admit any evidence to show that the
mind and memory of the witness have been impaired by disease and
are in a feeble condition for the purpose of impeachment. 25 Of
course, blindness, deafness, and other physical defects may be shown
to discredit a witness's testimony where such defects have a direct
bearing on the truth of the facts stated by the witness.
It should be remembered that different rules apply where the
character of a defendant in a criminal prosecution is being impeached
as a party, and not as a witness. 20 In such cases the character shown
goes as circumstantial evidence to show guilt rather than to affect the
credibility of the party. Here the character must first be put in
issue,2 7 and, having been put in issue, character for any trait approof crimes could not be shown, said, "You cannot therefore inquire

whether the witness has the reputation of being a thief, prostitute, murderer, gambler, adulterer, swindler, or the like; although each and every of
such offenses, to a greater or less degree, impairs the moral character of
the witness and tends to impeach his or her veracity."
'State v. Garland (1886) 95 N. C. 671 (excluding evidence offered by
defendant in a prosecution for seduction that prosecutrix was seen intoxicated
on one occasion).
'State v. Steen (1923) 185 N. C. 768, 117 S. E. 793; State v. Coley (1894)
114 N. C. 879, 19 S. E. 705.
"State v. Summers (1917) 173 N. C. 775, 92 S. E. 328; Edwards v. Price
(1913) 162 N. C. 243, 78 S. E. 145 (qualified by saying that he knew the
witness' reputation as a horsetrader was bad in certain localities).
" Stae v. Mills (1922) 184 N. C. 694, 114 S. E. 314; State v. Bullard (1888)
100 N. C. 484, 6 S. E. 185.
'Isler v. Dewey (1876) 75 N. C. 466 (evidence of mental condition of
witness given by non expert witness) ; Lord v. Beard (1878) 79 N. C. 5 (mental weakness of witness shown by expert witness).
Wigmore, Evidence (2nd. ed.) Vol. 1, secs. 55 to 59 incl.
=Marcon v. Adams (1898) 122 N. C. 222, 29 S. E. 333.
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priate to the crime charged may be used. 28 Where a party takes
the stand as a witness he may be impeached as any other witness,29
but even here evidence which would ordinarily be admissible for
impeachment will sometimes be excluded because of the undue prejudice it might have with the jury.3 0
C. W.
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PRESUMPTION OF DEATH FROM SEVEN YEARS
UNEXPLAINED ABSENCE

By judicial legislation in the decided cases and following the
analogy of two early English statutes, viz: one which protected
from the charge of bigamy any person whose spouse has been absent
across the seas for seven continuous years, upon marriage to another, and another which provided that any person in the enjoyment
of a lease for life who absents himself from home and remains away
for seven years without being heard from shall be presumed dead
and his lease at an end,' it has become the settled rule of almost
universal application that for all legal purposes a presumption of
death arises from a continued unexplained absence from home for
seven years where the absentee has not been heard from in that
period. 2 This presumption was created as a limitation upon the well
established permissible inference of continuing life until death was
proved. It is a mere logical terminus for the older rule that a person
is presumed to be alive until after such time as he would have died
'Wigmore,

Evidence (2nd ed.) Vol. 1, sec. 59; State v. McKinney (1918)

175 N. C. 784, 95 S. E. 162 (bad reputation for selling liquor admitted against
defendant on a charge of having liquor in possession) ; State v. McMillian
(1920) 180 N. C. 741, 105 S. E. 403 *(evidence that defendants had bad character for making liquor admitted in prosecution for illegal making of liquor) ;
Sore v. State (1907) 50 Tex. Cr. 569, 99 S. W. 551 (defendant's character as
a cautious and prudent officer admitted in prosecution for negligent homicide by
deputy sheriff) ; State v. Snover (1899) 63 N. J. L. 382, 43 Atl. 1059 (character for "morality, virtue, and honesty in living" admitted in prosecution

for carnal knowledge of one under age of consent).
" Wigmore, Evidence (2nd. ed.) Vol. 2. sec. 9.0; State v. Spurling (1896)

118 N. C. 1250, 24 S. E. 533.

" Wigmore, Evidence (2nd ed.) Vol. 2, sec 921.
'1 Jac. 1, Ch. 11, Sec. 2; 19 Car. 11, Ch. 6, Sec. 2.

'Doe v. Jesson, 6 East 80; Hopewell v. De Pina, 2 Campb. 113; Burr v.
Sinms, 4 Wheaton (Pa.) 150; Davie v. Briggs (N. C.,-1878) 97 U. S. 628;
Tisdale v. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 26 Iowa 170, 96 Am. Dec. 136; Kennedy
v. Modern Woodmen of America (1909) 243 Ill. 560, 90 N. E. 1084; Samberg
v. Knights of the Modern Maccabees, 158 Mich. 568, 123 N. W. 25; Asbury v.
Sanders, 8 Cal. 62, 68 Am. Dec. 300; University v. Harrison, 90 N. C. 387;
Sixer v. Severs, 165 N. C. 500; Vaughan v. Langford, 81 S. C. 282, 62 S. E.
316; Sharon v. McMackin, 9 Lea (Tenn.) 601; Sec. Bank of Richmond v. Equi.
Life Assur. Soc. of U. S., 112 Va. 462, 71 S. E. 647.
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of old age or be proved dead.3 The change was effectuated by a
process of judicial legislation, advancing from what originally was a
mere recognition on the part of the courts of logical reasoning by the
juries when they found death from long absence, to the declaration
4
of an affirmative rule of law.

On the trial of a case when the issue is the death of an absentee
and seven years absence from home without news is shown, it is
then a question of fact for the jury, under proper instructions, what
quantity or quality of evidence will be required to outweigh the presumption of death which the law projects into the equation.r5 The
presumption of death, if rebutting evidence is produced, is not absolute.6 But from the absence of such rebutting evidence the law
will conclude that the absentee is dead. And at this stage of the
trial, when no countervailing evidence has been introduced to rebut
the prima facie case of the plaintiff, the presumption of death is
conclusive and mandatory. Dean Wigmore says: "The judge will
'In Re Benjamin, 137 N. Y. Supp. 758; Hammond's Lessee v. Indoes, 4 Md.
230;
138; Hapfensach v. City of N. Y., 66 N. E. 11; Whiting v. Nichols, 46 Ill.
Stevens v. McNamara, 36 Me. 176; Proctor v. McCall, 2 Bailey (S. C.)
298. The usual rule is that in the absence of contrary proof, a presumption of continuing life to the common age of man exists, and the burden
is on the one alleging the death to establish the same: Asbury v. Sanders, 8
Cal. 62, 68 Am. Dec. 300; Stevens v. McNamara, 36 Me. 176; Watson v.
Tindall, 24 Ga. 494, 71 Am. Dec. 142; Hoyt v. Newbold, 45 N. J. L. 219.
"Itis a matter purely conjectural just why the specific number seven years
was hit upon. One theory and probably as reasonable as any was because the
number seven occupied a great part and assumed tremendous force in the lives
of the ancients-there were the seven planets, th seven wonders of the world,
the seven deadly sins, seven sleepers, etc. constantly before the minds of the
superstitious people. There were also many ecclesiastical rules and canons
that may have suggested the number seven. In the "Excerptiones" of Ecgbert,
Archibishop of York (A. D. 734-766) occurs this passage (translating freely) :
"The canon says that if a woman shall have departed from her husband,
despising him, and be unwilling to return and be reconciled to him, after five
or seven years, with the consent of the Bishop, he may take another wife."
Exc. 125: "Likewise, if a man's wife shall have been taken into captivity and
she cannot be ransomed, after the seventh year he may take another (wife)
and if later his own (wife),-that is, the former woman (first wife) returns
from captivity, he may take her (back) and may dismiss the later one.
Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence, page 320.
'Saunders v. Knights of the Modern Maccabees, 158 Mich. 568, 123 N. W.
560, 90 N. E. 1084;
25; Kennedy v,Modern Woodmen of America, 243 Ill.
Tisdale v. Conn. Mit. Life Ins. Co., 26 Iowa 170, 96 Am.Dec. 136; Sprigg v.
Moale, 28 Md. 497, 92 Am. Dec. 704-708 (extended note on the question) ; 2
Greenleaf, Evidence, Sec. 278.
'Mut. Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Martin, 108 Ky. 11, 55 S. W. 694 (error to
instruct jury to find for the plaintiff if the absentee has been away for seven
years and has not been heard from; the court should have told the jury that
the presumption of death arising from the facts might be rebutted by the
proof of circumstances offering an explanation for the absence).
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instruct the jury that if they find the fact of absence from home for
seven years unheard from and find no explanatory facts to account
for it, then by a rule of law they are to take for true the fact of
7
death."1
But if the defendant satisfies his burden of going forward-after
the plaintiff has established the absence-by introducing facts and
circumstances sufficient to afford an explanation of the absence,
which explanation is as consistent with life as with death, the legal
presumption of death changes from a conclusive and mandatory one
to a purely permissive presumption or inference. Even then, if
the jury think the ultimate probability of death overbalances the
probability of life, they will be warranted in finding the fact in issue
for the plaintiff-death. 8 If, however, under proper instructions
and weighing the facts and circumstances, the jury find the probability of life stronger, they would then be justified in finding for
the defendant-life.9 The fact is that the once conclusive and mandatory presumption, with the introduction of countervailing evidence,
has changed to a mere permissive inference.' 0
If on the trial of a cause the plaintiff has made out a prima facie
case of death, with the establishment of seven years of unheard from
absence, the burden of going forward with the evidence then shifts
to the defendant. He can satisfy that burden, i. e., avoid the danger
of having a verdict directed against him, by the use of testimonial
or circumstantial evidence. It is clear that any testimonial evidence
at his avail, tending to rebut the presumption of death, would be
admissible and effective. But if the defendant has no testimonial
evidence of such nature he should produce all the circumstantial
evidence of life that he can muster. The use of a letter received

'Wigmore, Evidence, 2490
'Mut. Ben. Life Ins. Co. v. Martin, 108 Ky. 11, 55 S. W. 694 (mere un-

explained absence is enough to warrant the jury finding the fact of death
therefrom; but if there are explanatory circumstances the jury should he told

to consider them).
'Thetford v. Modern Woodmen of America, 273 S. W. 666 (Texas)
"0Cogdell v. Wilmington & W. Ry., 132 N. C. 852, 44 S. E. 618. "A presumption has a technical force or value and the jury, in the absence of suffi-

cient proof to overcome it, should find according to the presumption; but in

case of a mere inference, there is no technical force attached to it. The jury,

in case of an inference are at liberty to find the ultimate fact one way or the
other as they may be impressed by the testimony. In the one case the law
draws a conclusion from the state of the pleadings and the evidence, and in the
other case the jury draws it. An inference is nothing more than a permissive
deduction from the evidence, while a presumption is compulsory and cannot be
disregarded by the jury."
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by any person from the absent one during the seven years would
be such a circumstance and would not be barred by the rule against
hearsay. 1 This is on the theory that the hearsay rule imposes no
objection to the use of letters, oral informations, etc., offered as circumstantial evidence that another person is insane, is incompetent,
12
has a violent character, is dead or alive.
Evidence showing a motive for the disappearance is admissible
to rebut the presumption of death. 13 The question whether the ab14
scondee was a refugee from justice would be such a circumstance.
The fact that he was in financial or domestic difficulties, and the
same caused him fear of disgrace, poverty, or imprisonment would
be such a circumstance that the jury would consider. 15 Many such
questions might arise. What sent the absentee away? What were
his domestic relations? What his financial standing? What was his
physical condition, his mental attitude, when last seen? These questions are all relevant and require weighing by the jury. The answers
are circumstances which must be taken into consideration by the
jury in arriving at the question: is the absentee dead? 16 None of
these facts will prevent a finding of death; but each is a circumstance which should have proper consideration by the jury in deter17
mining whether the original presumption has been rebutted.

C. R. JONAS
'Dowd v. Watson, 105 N. C. 476, 11 S. E 589 (a presumption of death
arises from the absence of a person for seven years without having, been
heard from. To rebut the presumption, it is not necessary to produce the
testimony of persons who have seen him, or to produce letters from him.
It is sufficient to produce evidence which will satisfy the jury that he has been

heard from within the seven years. "Such evidence is usually and almost
necessarily hearsay." The court then held that it was error to exclude from
the jury evidence of information that he was alive, merely because it was
hearsay information. Wilson v. Brownlee, 24 Ark. 586, 91 Am. Dec. 523 and
note.
'Wigmore, Evidence, Sec. 1789; Thetford v. Modern Woodman of America,
273 S. W. 671 (Texas).
Bonslett v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 190 S. W. 870 (Texas) ; Hoyt v. Newbold,
45 N. J. L. 219; 8 R. C. L. 713; and see the comprehensive note, "circumstances justifying inference of death of insured before the lapse of seven
years from his disappearance," 34 A. L. R. 1389.
"Mut. Ben. Life Ins. Co. v. Martin, 55 S. W. 694, 104 A. S. R. 202 (it is

a question for the jury upon all the circumstances whether the absentee is
dead-the fact that he is a fugitive from justice is such a circumstance).

"Sensenderfen v'. Pacific Mitt. Life Ins. Co., 19 Fed. 68 (evidence that the
one supposed to be dead was in a financial condition which might have induced him to abscond, or that he was a speculator or visionary in business,
is admissible to overcome the presumption of death from seven years absence).
"Fuller v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 199 Fed. 897.
"Winter v. Supreme Lodge K. P. of the World, 69 S. W. 662; Duff v. Duff,
137 S. W. 909; Magness v. Modern Woodmen of America, 124 S. W. 69.

